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LEGISLATION
The Federal Revenue Act of 1936
On March 3, 1936, President Roosevelt in his message to Congress stated:
"I invite your attention . . . to a form of tax which would accomplish an
important tax reform, remove two major inequalities in our tax system, and stop
'leaks' in present surtaxes." 1 On June 22, 1936, the President approved the
Act 2 which was the direct result of his message, and thereby put into effect a
major change in the taxation of corporate income. In former years, corporations
had been subjected to either a flat tax or a slightly graduated tax upon net
income,3 without regard being had to the subsequent use made of that income.
While the new Act continues the graduated tax upon net income with only small
variations in gradations, 4 its most important feature consists of a steeply gradu-
ated surtax upon the undistributed profits of corporations. This surtax rises to a
peak of twenty-seven per cent when the corporation retains more than sixty per
cent of its adjusted net income.
5
The Purpose of the Act
The major purpose of the Act is to prevent tax avoidance by those whose
income is subject to the higher individual surtaxes., Previously, many taxpayers
found it profitable to allow their income to accumulate in the form of corporate
reserves during the years when their income from other sources was high enough
to bring them within the upper tax brackets. The money left in the corporation
was never subjected to more than a fifteen per cent tax. Thereafter, either when
the surtax on individuals was lowered,7 or the individual's income for any one
i. H. R. Doc. No. 1418, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 2.
2. Pub. L. No. 740, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 22, 1936).
3. The last tax prior to the present Act ran from 12Y% on net incomes of $2000 to i5%
on incomes in excess of $4oooo. This was included in the 1935 amendment [49 STAT. 1015
(1935), 26 U. S. C. A. § 13 (Supp. 1935) ] to the REVENUE AcT OF 1934. 48 STAT. 686 (1934),
26 U. S. C. A. § 13 (Supp. 1935). This Act of 1934 bad imposed a flat rate of 13Y4% on the
net income of corporations. The same was true of the REVENUE Acr OF 1932 (47 STAT. 177).
4. See supra note 2.
5. Section 14.
6. President Roosevelt, Message to Congress, cited supra note I, at p. 3: "The accumu-
lation of surplus in corporations controlled by taxpayers with large incomes is encouraged by
the present freedom of undistributed corporate income from surtaxes. Since stockholders are
the beneficial owners of both distributed and undistributed corporate income, the aim, as a
matter of fundamental equity, should be to seek equality of tax burden on all corporate in-
come whether distributed or withheld from the beneficial owners. As the law now stands
our corporate taxes dip too deeply into the shares of corporate earnings going to stockholders
who need the disbursement of dividends, while the shareholders who can afford to leave earn-
ings undistributed escape current surtaxes altogether." H. R. REP. No. 2475, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1936) 3; see Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 12395, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 8oo; Hearings before Committee on Finance on H. R. 12395, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 22.
7. After the World War the surtax on individuals was rather high-the top bracket
being 65%. 40 STAT. iO64 (1919). The Republican Party came into power with President
Harding, who took office in March, 1921, and began to lower the top brackets. In the
Act passed in the fall of the inaugural year the 65L bracket was lowered to 5o%. 42
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year decreased so that he was no longer within the higher income brackets, he
would draw on these "incorporated pocketbooks". 8 Thus, many dollars were es-
caping the surtax mill. The federal government has attempted for many years, by
penalty taxation of unreasonable accumulations of corporate reserves, to prevent
this means of tax avoidance. This method, however, has been unsuccessful.9
Under the present Act, manipulation of the payments of corporate dividends is
rendered less likely and less effective because made less profitable.
The Act is intended also to remove certain inequities present under the former
tax laws. The feeling had long been current that there was too great a partiality
in taxation in favor of the corporate form of business, and against the indi-
vidual.10 A corporation could expand without limit, and yet be required to pay
only a fifteen per cent income tax,"' but if an individual's income extended beyond
a hundred thousand dollars he paid at least a fifty-eight per cent tax on all income
over that amount." Under these conditions any person whose income totalled
more than $3o,ooo (the sum at which the taxation of individuals and corpora-
tions is equal) naturally sought to carry on his business in a corporate form, in
order that the resultant corporate income, provided there were no dividends,
should not be subject to the tax of twenty per cent or greater which would. be
levied on individual income. Those antagonistic to the Act denied the existence
of inequities under the previous tax acts on the ground that any individual could
incorporate if he so desired.'? The proponents of the Act realizing that there are
many forms of activity that cannot be incorporated, such as law, medicine, etc.,
believed that by taxing the undistributed portion of the net income of corpora-
tions they were destroying the pre-existing differences in the taxation of cor-
porate and non-corporate businesses.
The Act is further aimed at another inequality: the differences in the tax-
ation of large-income and small-income shareholders caused by the imposition of
STAT. 237. See a comment upon this, Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means,
supra note 6, at p. 429. After Harding's death on August 2, I923, the Coolidge Ad-
ministration continued to lower the high surtaxes. In the 1924 Act there was another
io% decrease. 43 STAT. 267. Two years later this was lowered to 20% (44 STAT. 23)
and continued at that figure in the Act of 1928. 45 STAT. 797. In x932, the emergency
created by the crash of '29 and the consequent depression forced the administration to
raise the surtax to 55%. 47 STAT. x77.
8. See Jackson, The Proposed Revison of Corporation Taxes, N. Y. Times,
March I9, 1936, P. 21, col. 1.
9. The first attempt was a penalty tax upon the stockholders of corporations that
accumulated surpluses to avoid the individual taxes. 38 STAT. i66 (1913). This was
strengthened and continued in the succeeding acts but did not accomplish what it set out to do.
See President's Message, cited supra note I, at p. 3; H. R. REP. No. 2475, supra note 6, at p.
5; Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, supra note 6, at p. 776; Legis. (1933)
7 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 361.
Io. H. P, REP. No. 2475, supra note 6. "Now, what we are seeking to do here is to sub-
ject all income, both of corporations and individuals, to practically the same basis for tax
purposes." Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means, supra note 6, at p. .321; see
also id., at 341. Cf. REP. Comm. TAx & PUB. EXPENDiTURES, PHILA. CHAMBER OF COM-
mERCE (April, 1936) .5.
i. This refers to the 935 amendment [49 STAT. 1015, 26 U. S. C. A. § 13 (Supp.
1935)]; formerly the rate was even lower. See supra note 3.
12. 49 STAT. 1014 (1935), 26 U. S. C. A. § 12 (Supp. 1935).
13. Hearings before Committee on Finance, supra note 6, at p. 433; Hearings before
Committee on Ways and Means, supra note 6, at p. 8o6.
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flat rates on corporations. 14 Whether or not a corporation made a distribution to
its shareholders, it paid a tax of no more than fifteen per cent on its earnings; the
large-income and small-income shareholders, therefore, each bore the same per-
centage of tax on their proportional holdings. The Act may do much to remedy
this disparity by bringing about a greater distribution of earnings. But if the Act
does not produce this result, it will not only leave extant the inequalities between
large-income and small-income shareholders but will actually enhance them. And
although in the great majority of cases the Act should succeed, there are situa-
tions where it may fail. 15 For example, assume a hypothetical corporation that
earns one million dollars in 1936. The controlling stockholder owns fifty per
cent of the shares. The remaining shares are divided among one thousand
other shareholders. The normal tax on such a corporation is $148,840; the
adjusted net income, $851,I6o. Assume further that the controlling stockholder
is self-sufficient from other sources so that he is free to permit his portion of the
corporate earnings to accumulate in the corporation if he finds that course most
profitable to him. If the entire earnings are distributed in the form of dividends,
he will receive $425,5 8 o. The normal tax of four per cent on this amount is
$I7,023.2o and the surtax is $235,394.40, making a total of $252,417.6o or
slightly over fifty-nine and one-half per cent of his share of the corporate ern-
ings. If there are no dividends, his tax liability, disregarding the corporate entity,
is much less. In that case, the corporation will have an adjusted net income and
an undistributed net income of $851,I6O. The surtax on this amount is
$174,487.79. In other words, his $425,58o would now bear a tax of $87,243.90, or
twenty and one-half per cent, a saving of almost forty per cent,16 subject, of
course, to the eventual individual tax when that income is realized by him.
The interest of the other shareholders in the corporation, assuming that they
are in the normal and not surtax brackets, lies primarily in a distribution of divi-
dends. If there is a distribution, these shareholders will pay a four per cent
normal tax and no more; if all the earnings are retained by the corporation, their
proportion will be subjected to a twenty and one-half per cent surtax. It is in
such a factual set-up that the purpose of the Act may not be" effectuated, for the
controlling shareholder would undoubtedly do his utmost to prevent a corporate
distribution. Fortunately, however, such a corporate make-up is rare.
There is little doubt that the motivating desire of the government and the
taxing authorities was to tax each individual on a basis of his profits whether
14. One of "the major purposes of the change in the method of taxing corporate in-
comes . . . [is] (3) to remove the inequity as between large and small shareholders re-
sulting from the present flat corporate rates." H. R. REP. No. 2475, supra note 6. It was also
expressed that the idea of the new tax was to tax in proportion to the ability to pay and let
the government occupy a neutral position and not discriminate among its taxpayers. Hear-
ings before the Committee on Ways and Means, supra note 6, at p. 53.
There is some feeling that the "chief aim of the new law is, of course, to force declara-
tions of dividends, (and) collect high surtaxes from the rich." TimE (June :29, 1936) 12.
See also, R. G. Blakey and G. C. Blakey, The Revenue Act of 1936 (1936) 26 Am. Ec. REy.
466, 472.
It was also stated that the Act would avoid the inequality caused by the fact that share-
holders in a corporation that did not distribute its earnings under the former acts were in
effect reinvesting their earnings without paying any tax. On the other hand, stockholders of
corporations distributing their earnings had to pay a tax before reinvestment. It was felt
that the undistributed profits tax evened up this inequality in cost of reinvestment. 80 CONG.
Rac. 6174 (1936).
15. See Editorial, N. Y. Times, May 4, 1936, p. i8, col. I.
z6. See SEN. RE. No. 2156, Part 2, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 6.
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distributed to him or left in a corporation." If such a tax could be directly
levied, that is, if each individual had to include in his income tax returns his
proportionate amount of the income of any corporation of which he was part
owner, the new corporate surtax would be unnecessary.13 The controlling share-
holder would include in his income tax returns the $425,58o whether that amount
was distributed to him or not. Likewise, each of the other shareholders would
include that portion of $425,580 which represented his interest in the corpora-
tion's earnings. However, since the Supreme Court has held unconstitutional the
taxation of common share dividends received by a common shareholder on the
ground that the recipient realized no income,19 then a forliori it would seem that a
shareholder may not be taxed on undistributed income where there has not even
been the formality of a stock dividend declaration.20 Much of the present Act has
its origin in the attempt to circumvent this constitutional restriction.
Operation of the Act
The provisions dealing with the tax on individuals remain much the same
except that dividends, previously subjected only to individual surtax,21 are now
subjected to the normal tax as well.2 2 The importance of this change is increased
by the fact that the Act will result in a greater release of dividends.
Taxes upon corporate income have been radically revised. They now exist
in two forms: (i) the normal tax on corporations,2" and (2) the surtax on that
portion of net income which the corporation does not distribute.24  The normal
tax is similar to that of the 1935 revision of the Revenue Act, but contains steeper
gradations. Its basis is the sum found by subtracting from the net income the
total of the following: (i) interest on obligations of the United States and its
instrumentalities, and (2) eighty-five per cent of the amount received as divi-
17. Representative Lewis: "I do not know that it is fully understood by the public that
this roundabout device of compelling the distribution of the real income of the corporation to
its shareholders, so that the shareholders may be called upon to pay taxes upon their income,
is due to a decision of a divided court. Some years ago the Supreme Court in a sharp de-
cision determined that we could not . . . require the shareholder to pay his tax on his
income just the same whether his company had refused to distribute it or not.
"Now, if that decision of the Court should be reversed, what we are doing here, or at-
tempting to do in order to reach the taxpayer here, the method of our attempt, would not be
necessary. Not ours the fault of all this clumsiness and indirection of approach to a neces-
sary public object." Hearing before the Commttee on Ways and Means, supra note 6, at p.
193. In a letter to the writers of this legislation, Representative Lewis affirmed what is
rather clear, namely that he was referring to the case of Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189
(1921).
i. See supra note 17.
i9. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 (1921).
2o. There is increasing theoretical opinion that a tax upon stock dividends is an indirect
tax and therefore not within the prohibition of Art. I, § 2, cl. 3, and § 9, cl. 4, compelling
Congress to levy a direct tax proportionately among the several states. See Sphahr,
The Supreme Court on the Incidence and Effects of Taxation (1925) SmITH COLLEGE
STUDIES IN HISTORY 129, 130; Evans, A Constitutional Problem in Federal Income Taxation
(1935) 7 Rxy. MT. L. REV. 85, 97-IO8; Powell, Stock Dividends, Direct Taxes and the Six-
teenth Amendment (I92O) 2o COL L. REV. 536, 539-40; Magill, Realization of Income Through
Corporate Distributions (936) 36 CoL L. REv. 519, 526, n. 83. However, although it might
well be that the Court would refuse to overrule Eisner v. Macomber, yet if a tax upon the
privilege of accumulating a surplus in a corporation were levied it is possible that the Court
might uphold it as an indirect tax.
21. 48 STAT. 692 (1934), 26 U. S. C. A. §25 (T935).
2. Section 25 (a) (I) of the 1934 Act is omitted in the ig36 Act.
23. Section 13 (b).
24. Section 14 (b).
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dends from a domestic corporation subject to taxation under the Act. 5 This
sum is defined as the normal tax net income, and is taxed as follows:
First $2,ooo .............................. 8 per cent
$2,ooo to $15,ooo .......................... ii per cent
$15,ooo to $40,000 ......................... 13 per cent
The amount over $4o,ooo ...................... 15 per cent 26
The surtax upon that portion of the net income which the corporation does
not distribute provides the novel feature of the Act. In order to find the
amount of this tax, two figures must be determined: (i) The adjusted net
income--obtained by subtracting from the net income the sum of the follow-
ing: the normal tax paid and the interest upon obligations of the United States
or its instrumentalities. 27  (2) The undistributed net income-obtained by de-
termining the adjusted net income and subtracting from it the sum of the
following: (a) distributed dividends which are taxable in the hands of the
stockholder; (b) the amount which the corporation has contracted not to pay out
in dividends or the amount which the corporation has contracted to set aside
for the payment of debt.28 Once these two figures are obtained, the surtax may
be calculated as follows:
7% upon the first io% of the adjusted net income which is undistributed;
12% upon the next io% of the adjusfed net income which is undistributed;
17% upon the next 20o of the adjusted net income which is undistributed;
22%o upon the next 2o of the adjusted net income which is undistributed;
27%o upon the remaining 4o of the adjusted net income which is undis-
tributed.
2 9
The amount taxed is always the undistributed net income; the adjusted
net income is the yardstick determining the amount of the undistributed net
income which is to be taxed at the various percentages. For example, if the
undistributed net income is equal to fifteen per cent of the adjusted net income,
there is a seven per cent tax on that part of the undistributed net income which
is equal to ten per cent of the adjusted net income, and a tw.elve per cent tax on
the remaining portion of the undistributed net income, since that portion comes
within the second ten per cent of the adjusted net income.30
25. Section 13 (a).
26. Section 13 (b).
27. Section 14 (a) (i).
28. Section 14 (a) (2). Of the two provisions, contracts restricting the payment of divi-
dends and contracts providing for the disposition of profits for the year, the corporation can
only take advantage of one, and will naturally choose the larger. Section 26 (c) (3).
29. Section 14 (b).
3o. The following table can be be used to determine the undistributed profits tax and the
cost in per cent terms of retaining any portion of the adjusted net income. To use the table,
divide the undistributed net income by the adjusted net income. The quotient thus obtained is
the percentage of the adjusted net income that the corporation is retaining. The correspond-
ing figures in the second column state in percentage terms the amount of the adjusted net
income that the corporation will have to pay as a surtax. The third column gives the cost in
percentage terms of retaining the undistributed amount. To illustrate: If a corporation has
an adjusted net income of $Iooooo and distributes in dividends $2oooo, and has no other
credits, its undistributed net income is $8oooo. In other words, it is retaining eighty per cent
and that is the figure to be used in the first column. The second column gives the per cent of
the adjusted net income that the corporation will have to pay as a surtax-5.IO per cent.
This figure multiplied by the adjusted net income gives the amount of the surtax in dollars,
in this instance, $i5,ooo. The last column informs the corporation in percentage terms how
much of the amount retained it is paying as a surtax. In other words, the corporation is re-
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An important feature of the surtax is the provision whereby corporations
receive credit, that is, an amount which they may subtract from the sum that they
taining $8oooo but must pay the federal government 18.875 per cent of that amount in order
to do so. The result is that the corporation keeps $64,9oo of the original $8,ooo.
The undistribut- Percentage of Percentageofthe The undistribut- Percentage of Percentageof the
ed net income t he adjusted u n d i a t ributed ed net income the adjusted undistributed
divided by the netincomepaid net income the divided by the netincomepaid net income the
adjusted net in- in taxes to re- corporation pays adjusted net in- in taxes to re- corporation pays
come in percent- tan that pro- to r e t a i n that come in percent- tain that pro- to r e t a i n that
age terms, portion, amount, age terms. portion, amount.
1oo 20.5o% 20.500% 50% 7.50% 15.ooo%
99 20.23 20.434* 49 7.28 14.857*
98 ig.96 20.367* 48 7.o6 14.708*
97 19.69 20.298** 47 6.84 14.553*
96 19.42 20.229* 46 6.62 14.391*
95 19.15 20.157** 45 6.40 14.222*
94 I8.88 20.085* 44 6.z8 14.045*
93 I8.61 20.010** 43 5.96 13.86o*
92 18-30 19.934** 42 5.74 13.666**
91 18.07 19.857* 41 5.52 13.463*
90 17.80 19.777** 40 5.30 13.25
89 17.53 19.696** 39 5.13 13.153*
88 17.26 19.613** 38 4.96 13.052**
87 16.99 19.528** 37 4-79 I2.945*
86 16.72 "I9"4I** 36 4.62 12.833*
85 16.45 19.352** 35 4.45 12.714'
84 16.a8 19.261** 34 4.28 12.588*
83 15.91 19.168** 33 4.11 12.454**
82 15.64 19.073" 32 3.94 12.312**
81 15.37 18.975* 31 3.77 12.161*
80 15.10 18.875 30 3.60 12.000
79 14.83 18.772* 29 3.43 11.827**
78 14.56 18.666** 28 3.26 11.642**
77 14.29 18.558* 27 3.09 11.444"
76 14.02 18.447* 26 2.92 I1230**
75 13.75 18.333* 25 2.75 11.000
74 13.48 18.216* 24 2.58 10.750
73 13.21 18.095** 23 2.41 10.478*
72 12.94 17.972** 22 2.24 io.181**
71 12.67 17.845* 21 2.07 9.857*
70 12.40 17.714' 20 1.90 9.500
69 12.13 17.579** 19 1.78 9.368*
68 11.86 17.441* 18 1.66 9.222*
67 11.59 17.298** 17 1-54 9.058**
66 11.32 17.151** 16 1.42 8.875
65 11.05 17.000 15 1.30 8.666**
64 10.78 16.843** 14 1.18 8.428**
63 10.51 16.682** 13 i.o6 8.153**
62 10.24 16.516* 12 .94 7.833*
61 9.97 16.345** 11 .82 7-454"*
6o 9.70 16.166** IO .70 7.000
59 9.48 16.o67** 9 .63 7.000
58 9.26 15.965** 8 .56 7.000
57 9.04 15.859** 7 -49 7.000
56 8.82 15.750 6 .2 7.000
55 8.6o 15.636* .35 7.000
54 8.38 15.518** 4 .28 7.000
53 8.16 15.396* 3 .21 7.000
52 7.94 15.269* 2 .14 7.000
51 7.72 15.137* I .07 7.000
0 .00 0.000
*Indicates that there is a remainder of less than .ooo5.
**Indicates that there is a remainder of more than .ooo5.
Absence of * indicates that there is no remainder.
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would ordinarily use as the basis for calculating their undistributed profits tax,
for (i) those amounts which cannot be distributed without violating a provision
of a written contract executed prior to May I, I936,3' or (depending on which-
ever is greater) s2 (2) that amount which, under a similar contract the corporation
is either required to pay out in the discharge of debts or irrevocably to set aside
for that purpose within the taxable year,83 provided that the latter credit be lim-
ited to the amount actually paid or irrevocably set aside. Although these sections
were made part of the Act for the purpose of ameliorating possible hardship, the
Treasury Regulations bearing on the subject have practically destroyed all the
equity contained therein. Thus, under the provision for contracts restricting
payments of dividends, the Treasury Department has ruled that a charter of a
corporation does not constitute a written contract within the meaning of the sec-
tion.34 It has been said that "a complete and final definition of the word 'contract'
will perhaps never be reached. . . ." 8- However, without entering into a
technical discussion of whether a charter of a corporation constitutes a contract
in the orthodox sense, or constitutionally under the Dartmouth College case,38
nevertheless, it does appear that a corporate charter is within the spirit of the
section. It is probable that this regulation will not be upheld.
With regard to the provision concerning the allocating of profits for the pur-
pose of repaying debts, the Treasury Regulations again have been very narrow.
Contracts for the retirement of bonds or for the maintenance of sinking funds are
not within the section.3 7 But a contract requiring a corporation to set aside a
portion of its earnings to retire mortgage bonds is within the section.38  Such a
distinction is unjustifiable and it would seem that on a basis of fairness both
should be considered as proper deductible credits. It is obvious that the section
was incorporated in the Act for the purpose of alleviating the inequity that would
arise if a corporation that could not pay dividends were taxed at the same rate as
a corporation which, after weighing the comparative values, decided to retain its
income. However, under the Treasury Regulations many of the inequalities that
the section was designed to prevent, will return.
Finally, there is a provision designed to lower the surtax on corporations
of small income. There are two interpretations of the meaning of this section,
which reads:
"If the adjusted net income is less than $5o,ooo, there shall be allowed
a specific credit equal to the portion of the undistributed net income which
is in excess of Io per centum of the adjusted net income and not in excess
of $5,ooo, such credit to be applied as provided in paragraph (2).
(2) Application of specific credit.-If the corporation is entitled to a
specific credit, the tax shall be equal to the sum of the following:
31. Section 26 (c) (i).
32. Section 26 (C) (3).
33. Section 26 (c) (2).
34. U. S. Treas. Reg. 4674, Art. 26-3 (a).
35. United Transp. & Lighterage Co. v. New York & Baltimore Transp. Line, i8o Fed.
9o2, 904 (S. D. N. Y. igio), aff'd, 185 Fed. 386 (C. C. A. 2d, 191g).
36. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 5,7 (U. S. 8ig) ; see BLAcK, CONsTI-
TUTIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1927) § 280.
37. U. S. Treas. Reg. 4674, Art. 26-3 (c) : "A corporation having outstanding bonds isnot entitled to a credit under a provision merely requiring it, for example, (i) to retire annu-
ally a certain percentage or amount of such bonds, (2) to maintain a sinking fund sufficient
to retire all or a certain percentage of such bonds by maturity. . .
38. U. S. Treas. Reg. 4674, Art. 26-3 (b), Example Wi).
(A) A tax computed under subsection (b) [the ordinary surtax on
undistributed profits] upon the amount of the undistributed net income
reduced by the amount of the specific credit, plus
(B) 7 per centum of the amount of the specific credit." '9
It would seem that the reasonable interpretation of the section would re-
quire that the specific credit be calculated in the following manner: the amount
equal to ten per cent of the adjusted net ificome should be subtracted from the
undistributed net income, and the remainder should be the specific credit unless
that remainder were in excess of $5,000, in which case the specific credit would
be $5,ooo. In other words, the corporation is given as a credit that "portion of
the undistributed net income" which remains after subtracting from it ten per
cent of the adjusted net income, with the limitation, however, that the credit
cannot be more than $5,ooo. Although this seems rather clear, the Treasury
Regulations have interpreted the section as follows: "This specific credit is an
amount equal to the excess of $5,ooo or the total undistributed net income,
whichever is less, over io per cent of the adjusted net income and is to be de-
ducted from the undistributed net income before computing the surtax." 40 This
means that under the Treasury Regulations the specific credit is either the
undistributed net income or $5,ooo, whichever is less, minus ten per cent of the
adjusted net income. Under this interpretation the specific credit can never be
more than. $4,5oo. Assuming a corporation with an adjusted net income of
$4o,ooo and with no distribution or other credits, so that the undistributed net
income is $4o,ooo, and applying in turn the interpretation advanced above and
the interpretation of the Treasury, we arrive at this result:
Following the words of the Act, the "portion of the undistributed net
income which is in excess of 1o per centum of the adjusted net income" is
$36,ooo. (This amount is obtained by taking ten per cent of the adjusted net
income, $4,ooo, and subtracting it from the undistributed net income). How-
ever, since this amount ($36,ooo) is in excess of $5,ooo, the specific credit is
equal to $5,ooo. But under the Treasury Regulations. since the "total undis-
tributed net income" is more than $5,ooo, the specific credit is equal to $5,ooo,
minus ten per cent of the adjusted net income ($5,o0o-$4,ooo) or $i,ooo. The
total surtax, under the literal application of the Act would be $7,200; under
the Treasury Regulations the surtax would be $8,ooo. The difference between
the two interpretations here would be $8oo--the greatest it can be is $999.98.
39. Section 14 (c).
4o. U. S. Treas. Reg. 4674, Art. 14-4. The only attempt to justify the interpretation
which was subsequently adopted by the Treasury Department appears in C. C. H. Fed. Tax
Serv. ff 5278. The theory there presented is: The phrase in § 14 (I) to the effect that the
specific credit shall be "the portion of the undistributed net income which is in excess of io
per centum of the adjusted net income and not in excess of $5ooo", is almost identical with
the phrase repeated many times, except for changes in the numbers, in § 14 (b) to the effect
that the surtax shall be a certain percentage of "the portion of the undistributed net income
which is in excess of io per centum and not in excess of 2o per centum of the adjusted net
income." Therefore, states C. C. H., "It is a reasonable conclusion that the first-quoted
phrase should be interpreted in the same manner as the second, as to which second phrase
there is no difference of opinion. The second phrase means the difference between io and 2o
per cent. The first, therefore, should mean the difference between io per cent and $5ooo."
But this apparently overlooks the fact that it is not the difference between io and 2o per
cent of the adjusted net income which forms the basis of the surtax but rather the difference
between 9o% and 8o%, since the excess of io% is equal to 9o% and the excess of 2o% is
equal to 8o%. Therefore to arrive at the amount that will be taxed at a given percentage,
the second figure must be subtracted from the first. C. C. H. obtains its result by commit-
ting two errors: (i) it fails to interpret that "io%" to mean 9o%, and (2) it subtracts what
it erroneously takes to be the first figure from the second figure, thus reversing the pro-
cedure used in section 14 (b) the section to which it is attempting to analogize.
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The possibility of a corporation's reducing its tax liability by this not insignificant
amount will probably bring about a challenge of the Treasury's interpretation.
Arguments
One of the major arguments of those who opposed the taxation of undis-
tributed income was that it discriminated in favor of the old, established, and
well-to-do corporation which had accumulated ample reserves over a long period
of time,'4 1 and which could, therefore, dip into the accumulated surplus and
make distributions without financial difficulty, thereby escaping the surtax im-
posed by Section 14; whereas a corporation that had barely managed to survive
the depression and had no surplus would have to retain, in its rebuilding
process, a large amount of the net income of each year upon which there would
be the heavy surtax.4 2 Were this objection valid, the ability to pay theory would
be working in reverse, and the corporation with the greatest ability to pay
would pay the least. To consider this argument fairly, it must be realized
that under any system of law and as a matter of common sense, a corporation
with ample reserves is always in a more advantageous position than a corpora-
tion which has no surplus or is in debt.4 s And the corporation that finds itself
in the position where it must retain a portion of its net income can take ad-
vantage of Section 27 (e) and issue some form of taxable stock dividend. rIn
this manner the corporation will be able to retain its income for purposes of
rehabilitation and yet be free from the surtax. In the event that a corporation
later feels that its capital structure is topheavy it can go through a statutory
reduction of capital stock.44 However, there may be instances where the issu-
ance of share dividends will not be feasible or desirable. 45  The inequity caused
by the Act in such a situation might have been lessened considerably by exemp-
tion of twenty-five per cent of the undistributed net income from the surtax.
Another point raised by those hostile to the Act was that discrimina-
tion would result because of varying provisions in the corporation laws of the
several states.46  That the Act would favor corporations situated in a state
whose laws permit dividends to be paid from current earnings despite an
impaired capital 47 is the underlying thought. That this is a defect in construc-
41. Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means, supra note 6, at pp. 53, 137, 157,
i77, i 8 (d), 217, 738 (5), 805, 8o8 (12) ; Moley, Tax Plan vs. The New Deal (March 28,
1936) TODAY 12; H. R. REP. No. 2475, supra note 6, at pp. 19, 24. Senators Black and LaFol-
lette feared that the increase of the flat rate of 3% upon corporations would strike a blow at
the struggling corporations but did not have this same fear of the undistributed profits tax.
SEN. REP. No. 2156, Part 2, supra note 16, at pp. 3 et seq. See also for a slight variation of
this latter view, 8o Cong. Rec. lO683 (1936). For the views of the various newspapers on
the Act see U. S. News, June 29, 1936, p. IO, cols. 1-4.
42. See Hearings before Committee on Finance, supra note 6, at p. 378.
43. See Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means, supra note 6, at p. 18o.
44. Notes (1935) 21 VA. L. REv. 562, 44 YALE L. J. 1025; Breisch, Avoiding Tax Prob-
lem by Reduction of Stated Capital, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Oct. 16, 1936, p. 4, col. 6.
45. A corporation may be in a position where it has issued all its authorized capital stock
and would have to amend the charter in order to issue another share dividend. This may not
be convenient if the corporate set-up is unwieldy so that the interests of the various share-
holders conflict-some desiring share dividends, others more desirous of cash. Also, a cor-
poration whose capital is impaired cannot issue stock dividends in most states.
46. Hearings before Committee on Finance, supra note 6, at pp. 293, 294; Hearing before
Committee on Ways and Means, supra note 6, at p. 846.
47. It is elementary that states vary in the permission that they grant to corporations to
pay dividends. See Weiner, Theory of Anglo-American Dividend Law: American Statutes
and Cases (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 461, 462. In some states corporations cannot declare divi-
dends so long as their capital is impaired, or if this payment would impair their capital. E. g.,
ILL. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 32, 116 ;Orlo CODE (Throckmorton, 1934) § 8623-41; TENN. CoDE.
ANN. (Michie, 1932) § 3722 (9). In others, the general incorporation laws provide that such
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tion of the Act is obvious. However, as a matter of practicability it would seem
easier for the states to adapt their laws to meet the conditions set up by a federal
tax law, than for a federal tax act, governing businesses incorporated under forty-
eight different sovereignties, to make allowances for the variations in the laws of
the several states.
The conservative opposition to the new principle of taxation embodied in
the present Act urged that the Act would compel the distribution of profits
each year thus creating a situation in which corporations would not have sufficient
reserves to carry them through unforeseen circumstances caused by extraordinary
conditions of nature such as floods and fires or unusual economic crises.48
Believing this to be an attempt to substitute governmental regulation for the
judgment of the directors of the corporations, the opposition became even more
irritated.4 9 The latter assertion loses much of its force upon the realization
that directors can declare taxable stock dividends and thus retain their surpluses
as capital.
As to floods and fires, the answer is increased insurance.50 The corpora-
tions will probably use the funds that they would ordinarily keep as reserves
for unusual conditions, to purchase insurance. Already there is some indi-
cation that corporations, under the impetus given them by the new surtax,
distributions cannot be made if the corporation is, or will thereby be rendered, insolvent. E.
g., MD. CODE ANN. (Bagby, 1924) Art. 23, § 38; MASS. GEN. LAws (1932) c. 156, §37; MO.
REv. STAT. (1929) § 4569; N. H. PuE. LAWS (1926) C. 225, § 79. Still other combinations
of these laws exist. E. g., ARx. STAT. ANN. (Castle, Supp. 1931) § 170y; ME. REv. STAT.
(1930) c. 56, § 37. And in California and Delaware, corporations are permitted to distribute
dividends despite an impaired capital, if the income is declared out of current earnings. CAL.
CIV. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 346; DEL. CoaR. LAW (1935) §34 (b).
48. Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means, supra note 6, at p. iii; H. R. REP.
No. 2475, supra note 6, at p. 19 (No. i).
49. Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means, supra note 6, at pp, 24, 739 (9);
H. R. REP. No. 2475, supra note 6, at p. I9 (5) ; Social and Economic Experiments Under
the Guise of Taxation, Doc. No. 129 (July, 1936) Am. LIM. LEAGUE PAMPULET 3, 6.
Hearings before Committee on Finance, supra note 6, at p. 415. "It would act either to
bribe or coerce corporations into following a policy that would injure their credit. .. ."
Editorial, N. Y. Times, May 4, 1936, p. x8, col. i. Although most objectors argued that
the Act will compel the issuance of dividends, there was one variation of the usual state-
ment made during the hearings that is probably nearer correct for many instances, namely,
that "The man who sits as a director of a corporation, and who has to determine how much
to hold in the business, knows that he is going to make the stockholder happy if he gives
him a little more money, and he knows that he is going to save taxes if he gives him a little
more money, which will outweigh his sober judgment on all questions of policy as against
the maintenance of the firm business structure, of the fundamental that he ought to be con-
sidering first, and it is there that this thing is particularly bad in its concept, it seems to me,
as contrasted to taking just as much money by a straight tax that goes on every corporation
alike, whether it chooses to keep the money in the business or to disburse it to the share-
holder." Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means, supra note 6, at p. 322.
It would seem from the arguments of those opposed to the Act on this point that di-
rectors of our corporations have been managing their financial policies with respect to divi-
dends very well in the past. However, W. H. Pouch, Chairman of the Industrial Loan
Advisory Committee of the N. Y. Fed. Res. Bank states the following: "During past 18
months acting as chairman industrial loan advisory committee Federal Reserve Bank, sec-
ond district, I have personally reviewed over i,ooo applications for loans from small and
medium-sized companies and partnerships. I am firmly convinced the major cause for
their unsound financial condition necessitating their demand upon Government for working
capital was due to policy of paying dividends out of proportion to their earnings during
years 1930, 1931, and 1932 thus depleting their liquid adequate working capital to meet their
financial needs when increased volume of business was presented to them." Hearings before
Committee on Ways and Means, supra note 6, at p. 210.
5o. This may not be true for giant corporations, such as U. S. Steel. In the case of
these associations, self-insurance in the nature of reserves is as socially sound as the pur-
chase of insurance in an insurance company, which may be smaller than the corporation it-
self. In these cases there is a defect in the Act.
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are spending their surplus profits for deductible items which at the same time
constitute assets to the business. 5' As insurance is such an item, it is very
probable that corporations will now increase their expenditures in that direction.
Such a course seems socially desirable, for it is economically sound to have the
insurance risks of disasters which affect a total community, such as floods
or earthquakes, distributed over the entire nation so that the repercussion of the
disaster will not affect a single community.
As to the point that the tax will not leave sufficient reserves to tide cor-
porations through future depressions, the primary consideration, as stated by
Herman Oliphant, General Counsel of the Treasury, is: "We have profited
and can profit only by our past experience . . . that the greatest depression
in the history of the country followed the accumulation of the greatest cor-
porate surpluses in the history of the country." 52 In other words, the value
of huge corporate surpluses is debatable, since they tend to be used in a
manner not totally beneficial to society and as a result are often a direct cause
of the depressions 53 they are purportedly designed to withstand.
Some have expressed the fear that the tax will tend to act as a prohibition
against the repayment of existing debt inasmuch as the cost of repaying debts
will be increased."4 This picture is drawn: A corporation has a net income of
$ioo,ooo (normal tax net income). Upon this it must pay a normal tax of
$13,84o. This leaves an adjusted net income of $86,16o. If the corporation
desires to use approximately a third of this to retire a previous debt, not allowed
as a deduction, it will distribute in dividends $6o,ooo, retaining an undistributed
net income of $26,16o upon which it must pay a surtax of $3,155. Factually this
is true, but that corporations will stop paying debts is doubtful. Certainly our
corporate businesses will not allow themselves to be thrown into bankruptcy for
failure to pay their debts if they are at all able to meet them. If at the maturity of
the obligation the corporation finds that it is impossible or unwise to repay the
debt using its own funds, it may find it necessary, as a last resort, to borrow from
Peter to pay Paul, with the net result that a substitution of creditors will take
place, although there will be no decrease in the total amount of debt. But many
corporations will be able to avail themselves of other means of paying their
debts. For example, they may sell stock, distribute taxable stock dividends
(using the capitalized surplus to pay the debts) or they may liquidate portions of
their capital for the retirement of the debts. In any event, it is questionable
whether the Act has prejudiced the position of the creditor class.
Some bankers objected to the Act because they said it would force them
to curtail loans.15  This argument assumes that corporations will hesitate in the
5I. That the Act has increased the amount that business is spending for advertising see
Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Sept. 28, 1936, p. I, col. 2.
52. Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means, supra note 6 at p. 640.
53. See FoSTER AND CATCHINGS, BUSINESS WITHOUT A BUYER (Pollak Foundation for
Economic Research No. io, 1927) ; Hunter, The Taxation of Economic Surplus (1935) 13
TAX MAG. 270, 271, advocates the high taxation of economic surplus for the purpose of
preventing depressions. Altman, Control of the Business Cycle by Means of the Income
Tax (1935) 13 TAx MAG. 9, states that much of the fluctuation of business can be averted
by taxation which will prevent overaccumulation of savings.
54. Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, supra note 6, at p. 178; H. R.
REP. No. 2475, supra note 6 at p. 29 (3) ; 8o CoITG. REc. 10454 (1936) ; Moley, Tax Plan v.
the New Deal, TODAY (March 28, 1936) 12.
55. Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means, supra note 6, at pp. 178 (f), 762;
H. R. REP. No. 2475, supra note 6, at pp. I9 (7), 24. There were also variations of the
same general argument expressed. See Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means,
supra, at p. 761 (Act will disturb confidence of creditors of corporations and lead to general
curtailment of credit and requirement of cash); EcoNoMIc CoNDITIONS (May, 1936) 72
(Act will increase uncertainty in the relationship between a bank and its corporate custom-
ers).
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future to set up sinking funds or to make other provisions for the repayment
of loans, inasmuch as money set aside for amortization purposes will be sub-
jected to a high tax. It is probably true that the Act will have the effect of
reducing the number of sinking fund clauses in future loan arrangements. 8
However, creditors will probably protect their position by wider use of install-
ment repayment agreements. On the whole, although the Act may cause a
change in the method of financing long term loans, it is debatable whether the
change will be harmful; the likelihood is that in the long run the change will be
neither materially better nor worse.
During the process of draftsmanship much discussion centered about the
effect that the Act would have upon the formation and encouragement of
monopolies. Those objecting to the bill argued that the increased pressure of a
surtax would cause small corporations to distribute their earnings instead of using
them for expansion. 57  If this premise is accepted, the conclusion is reached
that such corporations will not grow, while large corporations which have sur-
pluses and greater facilities for raising capital, will be able to increase their size.
Furthermore, the large corporations will be aided by a lack of normal growth
among the smaller corporations. The argument seems logically sound, but takes
as its major premise the prediction that small corporations will remain static.
There is no reason why this condition should be true. A small corporation under
the Act is often in a much better position than a larger corporation to obtain
capital for the purpose of expansion. The elasticity of the small corporation will
enable it to issue taxable stock dividends and thus have the capitalized surplus
available for expansion; its stockholders are usually in the lower individual in-
come tax brackets, and therefore should be willing to receive the income, pay
the tax, and reinvest in the corporation. On the other hand, a large corpora-
tion might, because of the unwieldy condition of its capital structure, be com-
pelled to compete upon the open market for the investment of the dividends it
had paid to its stockholders.
Interestingly enough, the proponents of the Act urged that it would dis-
courage monopolies.58 Their reasoning was that for many years our tax laws
had aided and abetted the creation of monopolies. Wealthy stockholders, whose
investments were usually in the larger corporations, chose not to withdraw their
money, thus escaping the high individual surtaxes. With these assets the corpora-
tion bought out smaller competitors, and thereby extended its control over the
sources of production and the markets. In short, the tax laws previous to the
present Act encouraged the concentration of wealth which in turn was used for
monopolistic purposes.
It is fairly clear, from an examination of the two arguments, that whether
the taxation of corporate undistributed profits will result in the encouragement
or discouragement of monopolies is unpredictable. Inasmuch as the growth of
monopolies was not hindered by the previous revenue acts,59 a fairly safe con-
clusion is that the new Act will at least do no more than leave the situation where
it was formerly.
A strong economic argument against the Act was that it would accentuate
the business cycle.8 0  The basis of this argument lies in the assumption that
56. The Financial Situation (1936) 143 CoMM. & FIN. CHRON. I.
57. Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means, supra note 6, at pp. 178 (e), 297,
8o8 (I6), 794-5; H. R. REP. No. 2475, supra note 6, at p. 19 (4).
58. Jackson, The Proposed Rezision of Corporation Taxes, N. Y. Times, March ig,
1936, p. 21, Col. I.
59. See LAIDLER, CONCENTRATION OF CONTROL IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY (1931) c. 23;
FETTER, THE MASQUERADE OF MONOPOLY (1931).
6o. Moley, Tax Plan vs. the New Deal (March 28, 1936) TODAY 12; Hearings before the
Committee on Ways and Means, supra note 6, at p. 211; H. R. RE. No. 2475, supra note 6
at p. ig; Editorial, N. Y. Times, May 4, 1936, p. 18, col. x.
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corporations will be forced to pay out dividends in times of large earnings and
thus will have no surplus or reserves with which to continue dividends during
times of depression. Consequently, the peak of prosperity will rise higher under
the impetus of increased forced dividends, and the trough of depression will go
much deeper because there will be no surplus from which dividends may be
distributed. Opposed to this is the equally valid argument that the Act will aid in
flattening the curves of the business cycle if it succeeds in forcing distributions of
dividends during years of prosperity. The basis of this latter statement is, of
course, the economic theory that savings tend to go into productive goods and if
the policy of thrift is continued for too long a period the equilibrium between pro-
ductive and consumptive goods is overthrown. The result is a lack of demand for
the goods produced, the suspension of operation until the equilibrium is restored,
with consequent idleness during the readjustment process. This inactivity in the
long run is more wasteful than less thrift would have been."' Of course, a per-
fect balance is the ideal. Since many have argued that the former tax laws
tended to encourage the accumulation of corporate surpluses to too great an ex-
tent, and others argued that the new Act will discourage corporate thrift, there
is a possibility that the new Act may aid in attaining the happy medium. More-
over, the contention that the taxation of corporate undistributed profits will ac-
centuate the business cycle presupposes a knowledge of the causation of the
business cycle that does not exist. At present there are at least fifteen theories
of the causes of business cycles, ranging from sun spots, held by the disciples of
Professors Jevons and Beveridge of England, to rainfall, held by Professor
Moore of Columbia University.62 In fact, under some of the theories of business
cycles, held by eminent authorities in -the field of taxation, the undistributed
profits tax should aid in smoothing out many of the mountains and valleys in our
economic chart. Professor Hunter has said: "Recent events . . . seem to
indicate that over-investment or over-expansion of equipment is an important
contributing cause of our present industrial delirium. . . . Taxation of the
surplus, then, may have the effect of smoothing out the severity of business
fluctuations to the extent that over-investment or underconsumption is a cause
of such fluctuations." es
The usual conflicts as to who will bear the burden of the tax arose, of course,
in connection with the new Revenue Act. It was argued before the Finance
Committee that the tax would be shifted to the consumer.64 However, it is an
elementary economic principle that a general tax upon net income cannot be
shifted to the consumer,65 although there is a sound argument that part of a tax
upon the net income of a particular occupation may be.68 The theory upon which
this is based is that the producers subject to the tax will be at a disadvantage com-
pared to producers in other lines of business, so that the capital invested in the
former will tend to desert the field. The resulting diminution in supply will in-
crease the price. The net effect is either a reduction in production in the
field subject to the tax, or an increased price with the incidence of the tax
falling upon the consumer. However, the present tax is not subject to that
objection because it is sufficiently general in its application. Another pos-
sibility that the tax may be shifted to the consumers arises in the case of a
6I. See generally, Moulton, Commercial Banking and Capital Formation (1918) 26 J
lOL ECON. 42; FosTRa AND CATCHINGS, loc. cit. supra note 53.
62. See BYE AND HEwvir, APPLIED ECONOMICS (1930) 342 et seq.
63. The Taxation of Economic Surplus (1935) 13 TAX MAG. 270, 271.
64. Hearings before Committee on Finance, supra note 6, at p. 513.
65. SELIGMAN, SHIFTING AND INCIDENCE OF TAXATION (1892) 167; BYE AND HEWITT,
op. cd. supra note 62, at 456.
66. SELIGMAN, op. cit. supra note 65, at pp. 164-5.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
monopoly that has not as yet reached a monopoly price.17 Investigations of the
problem have shown, as would be expected, that in most instances monopolies
have kept their prices at the highest point consistent with the greater returns.6 s
Assuming this to be true, there would seem to be very little likelihood that the
tax will be shifted even here. There is also a view that if an income tax is laid
exclusively upon a line of business which is carried on entirely by corpora-
tions, the tax may be passed on to the consumer. 9 This is on the theory
that individual competition will be lacking as a result of which a general upward
movement in price in the entire field will take place. However, if that were so,
there is little doubt that individuals would come into the particular business and
compete with the corporation. In brief, there is little foundation for the argu-
ment that the present tax will be shifted to consumers.
It has been asserted that the tax will be shifted to labor.7 0  But most
economists feel that a tax upon net income or economic surplus cannot be shifted
but rather must lie where it falls. 7'1 Labor is a product subject to fluctuations
just as is any other economic good. The price it brings, wages, is the highest
amount it can summon in a competitive market under the influence of supply and
demand. Inasmuch as the present tax is only upon corporations, it can readily
be seen that should corporations attempt to lower wages, the probable result
would be a migration of more efficient labor to businesses run by individuals.
Corporate business, in order to compete for the most efficient labor, would be
compelled to raise wages. It is probable also that labor in its present organized
form would not tolerate any general reduction in wages, as would be necessary
should the corporation seek in that way to pass on the undistributed profits tax.
The cry of double taxation has also been raised.72 Those attempting to de-
feat the Act said that it would militate against the stockholders of a corporation
which could not distribute its earnings as a result of which the earnings would
be doubly taxed. The example cited was that of a corporation earning $ioo,ooo
in a year when for some reason or another it could not declare dividends. There-
fore, the corporation would pay the normal tax and the surtax. The following
year the corporation, finding itself in a position to liquidate this profit, would
distribute it to the stockholders. Inasmuch as it now would be income in the
hands of the stockholders it would be again subject to the income tax, both
normal and surtax. Formerly, there was some relief for this in that the cor-
poration paid only the normal tax, and when the dividends were paid out, the
stockholder included them solely in his surtax returns. Although the factual
basis of this argument is perfectly sound, whether it is objectionable is a matter
of opinion. There is authority for the view that the corporation is for purposes
of taxation a separate entity and should be taxed as such.71 Secondly, the
double taxation here rests primarily on the basis of ability to pay.74 If a stock-
67. Ibid; see I TAUSsIG, PRINCIPLES OF ECoNW ICS (1911) c. 12.
68. See JENKS AND CLARK, THE TRUST PROBLEM (1929) c. 7; JONES, THE TRUST PROB-
LEM IN THE UNITED STATES (1922) C. II.
69. Seligman, Can Income Taxes Be Shiftedf (1924) 2 NAT. INCOME TA.X MAG. 101.
70. Professor Clyde L. King: "I have talked with a few folks who feel that this tax
will be added to prices and be shifted to consumers. For the life of me I cannot see how
that can be. For the burden of the tax is not the same on all competitors in the same in-
dustry. I think the tax in most instances will in part at least be absorbed by reducing the
number of employees to a point where the total thus saved will about equal the tax. I feel
convinced that others will pass the tax back to all wage-earners by reducing wages or by not
increasing wages in proportion as prices rise. In either case the burden is shifted to labor, and
will be kept on labor." Address under auspices of Penna. Econ. League delivered before
Soc. for Advancement of Management, April 24, 1936.
71. See supra note 65.
72. Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means, supra note 6, at p. 809.
73. STUDENSKI, CHAPTERS ON PUBLIC FINANCE (1935) 577.
74. See Buehler, The Principle of Expediency and Justice in Taxation (1936) 21 BULL.
NAT. TAx Ass'N 130, 131-2.
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holder's income is so low that it is not within the income tax brackets, then his
portion of the earnings is subject only to the normal tax and surtax of the cor-
poration but is not taxed upon distribution. If a stockholder is in the middle
brackets, upon distribution he pays another tax-but only a medium-sized one.
If a stockholder is in the upper individual income brackets, then he is taxed to
the hilt. Thus, this much can be said for the principle, that although double
taxation is present, it does conform with the theory of ability to pay.
The exemption of corporations in bankruptcy and receivership brought
forth the fear that many corporations would be tempted to go into bankruptcy in
order to escape the undistributed profits tax.75 However, the loss of prestige
and injury to credit,78 the decrease in value of the good will, the loss of control of
the property which passes into the hands of the court,77 the fees of receivers,
attorneys, etc., will probably overcome any temptation to take advantage of that
section. And should there still be a temptation, it should not be forgotten that
there are many statutory restrictions imposed upon a corporation before it may
enter the sanctuary of bankruptcy.
The capital goods industries presented the plea that much of their income
must be used in order to buy new machinery and that this tax upon the use of such
income for that purpose will raise the cost of new machinery to them to such an
extent as to make the investment prohibitive.78 This argument is very similar to
the one that the tax will prevent industrial expansion because of lack of reinvested
savings.79  However, "The answer, of course, is that where there is a genuine
opportunity for expansion, industry will get the capital as it always has-by
issuing new stock, by floating bonds, by taking advantage of the present low
interest rates and borrowing from the" banks, or . . . [by use of surplus].
Capital has never been so plentiful or so cheap. The tax bill imposes no restric-
tion on industrial expansion. It merely requires that the owner of capital pay
his income tax before the money is invested. And it serves as a sorely needed
protection against the accumulation of unused surpluses which was a primary
cause of the depression." 80
A final cry of discrimination was based on the ground that the new Act
would place corporations selling on a cash basis, such as chain stores and mail
order houses, in a more favorable position than those corpoi-ations compelled to
sell on credit, the thought being that corporations engaged in cash transactions
are able to distribute dividends more easily than creditor corporations, having an
income on their books but not in their treasuries."' However, the latter cor-
porations may place themselves on a par with the more liquid corporations by
issuing some form of taxable stock dividend. 2
75. Hearings before Committee. on Ways and Means, supra note 6, at pp. 594-5.
76. See I GEnEs, CORPORATE REORGANIZATION (1936) § 48.
77. Note (935) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 992.
78. Hearings before Committee on Finance, supra note 6, at pp. 5oo, 509.
79. Thompson, Governor Landon Versus Senator Robinson, N. Y. Herald-Tribune,
Sept. 3, 1936, p. 19, cols. 7, 8; H. R. REP. No. 2475, supra note 6, at p. 23.
8o. A Reply to Dorothy Thompson (Sept. 12, 1936) NATION 292, 293.
8I. Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means, supra note 6, at p. o8 (7).
82. In addition to the many arguments and objections aired in the various hearings and
debates there is an obvious defect in the administrative provisions of the Act which is not
inherent in the principle of taxing undistributed corporate income. The surtax is imposed
upon the undistributed net income of each taxable year and for a corporation to obtain a
dividends paid credit, the dividend must actually be received by the shareholder within the
taxable year. U. S. Treas. Reg. 4674, Art. 27-1 (b). This means that a corporation must
calculate, before knowing the amount of its net income for any given year, the am6unt of divi-
dends that it will distribute. And if a corporation underestimates that net income, and
thereby issues a smaller amount of dividends than it would have issued had it known before-
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Constitutionality
There has been some doubt raised as to the constitutionality of the Act.83
The General Counsel for the Treasury has stated that, in his opinion, the Act
is constitutional; s4 there have also been statements to the contrary.83 An
analysis of the question involves a discussion of the purposes and effects of the
Act.
One of the purposes of the Act, although generally stated indirectly, and
certainly one of the effects of the Act, is to compel corporations to distribute a
portion of their earnings and profits each year.86 On this basis there were many
statements that Congress was attempting to regulate the distribution of corporate
earnings. It is well settled that Congress may regulate by taxation, provided the
subject matter is within the constitutional powers of Congress to control.8 7 How-
hand what its net income was going to be, its surtax will be correspondingly higher. There
is some relief found in the dividend carry over provisions § 27 (b) ] whereby a corporation
may secure credit in a later year for an amount of dividends paid in a prior year in excess
of the amount required to obtain full advantage of the dividends paid credit section.
Another perennial argument that was raised as an objection to the Act was that it will
drive capital out of productive enterprise and into the field of tax exempt securities. See
H. R. REP. No. 2475, supra note 6, at pp. i (8), 26; Hearings before Committee on Finance,
supra note 6, at p. 94. This contention is by no means novel and merits no new discussion.
See HARDY, TAx-ExEMP"r SECURITrES AND THE SURTAX (Publication of the Institute of
Economics, 1926) ; Taxation and Tax-Exempt Income, Sm. Doc. No. 148, 68th Cong., ist
Sess. (1924) (Rep. of Fed. Trade Comm.). For a discussion of this problem relating to
the present Act see Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means, supra note 6, at pp.
583 et seq.
83. C. C. H. Fed. Tax Serv. Special Revenue Bull. (May 13, 1936): "There are opin-
ions, however, that the Bill is vulnerable constitutionally on the theory of the Hoosac
Mills AAA case. View is that purpose of Bill is to control corporation policies-a subject
not within legislative power of Congress." See 8o CONG. REc. 6319, 6183 (1936). Phila. Legal
Intelligencer, Aug. 6, 1936 p. I, col. 2: "Against the background of preparation .for imposi-
tion of the tax appeared the likelihood that constitutional challenge of, the new levy will
be made in the courts . ... "
84. Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means, supra note 6, at p. 621.
85. See supra note 83.
86. One of the purposes stated is to "prevent avoidance of surtax by individuals through
the accumulation of income by corporations." H. R. REP. No. 2475, supra note 6, at p. 3.
Senator Black: "What you are seeking to bring out here is, as I understand it . . . . If
there were small stockholders in the corporation . . .who only owned a very small block
of stock, who would not have had to pay 15 per cent. on their normal individual income,
it was to their interest to have that money distributed, and so they were injured if the cor-
poration held it and did not pay it out." Hearings before Finance Committee, supra note 6,
at p. 21. "Because by the control being exercised by a small group, as we know it is exer-
cised in every large corporation in America, and sometimes only three men might pass on
ioo,ooo stockholders' rights, under that system that has been operating, that group that
controls the large number of stockholders can withhold the stock and pay a 15 per cent
tax even on the profit of the very small investor, while the larger investor might escape the
So per cent. tax which other unfortunate citizens would pay who did not happen to be in
terested in that corporation by owning a large block of stock?" Id. at 54. Compare state-
ment of Senator Barkley: "It is not the concern of this bill to squeeze money out of the
corporation treasury into the hands of stockholders, but it is the purpose of this bill that,
whether it is squeezed or not, it shall pay a tax." Id. at 53. Also statement of Chairman
Doughton: "There is no intention or desire whatever to interfere with the internal manage-
men of business enterprises. The object of this revenue measure is not to tell corporate
management what proportion of earnings they shall distribute and what proportion they
shall retain. The object is rather to see that, whatever the decision of corporate manage-
ments, the Federal Government shall not be unreasonably and inequitably deprived of neces-
sary revenue and that the tax burden is equitably distributed." 8o CONG. Rsc. 6175 (1936).
87. "One indirect means that has often been used for the control of our social and
economic life is taxation. The use of taxation for that purpose, where it is only secondary
to that of raising revenue, has long been held to be within the taxing power of Congress."
Altman, Control of the Business Cycle by Means of the Income Tax (I935) 13 TAX MAG.
9, 1o. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (U. S. i87o) ; Legis. (935) 24 GDo. L. J. 122.
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ever, many of the corporations subject to taxation under the Act would probably
be regarded, for most purposes, as engaged in intrastate commerce, and thus not
subject to regulation by Congress under its ordinary powers.88 The argument
runs to the effect that Congress is attempting to use the taxing power to regulate
the financial policies of corporations-a subject which it could not directly regu-
late. The Supreme Court has permitted Congress, on certain occasions, to tax
in a manner equivalent to regulation that which is not subject to regulation
under the delegated powers of Congress Il; on other occasions the Court has
forbidden it. ° The test used by the Court would seem to be twofold: (i) Is
there an absence of rules and regulations concerning a subject foreign to the
stated objective of gaining revenue? 91 (2) Is the Act on its face a revenue
measure? 92
Although it may be doubtful whether a tax act would be held constitutional
if it met only one of these questions, 93 yet it seems clear that if an affirmative
answer can be given to both the Act would be held constitutional. The present
Act falls in the second category for there is no rule or regulation in the Act that
does not directly pertain to the acquisition of revenue, and none of the sections
governs distributions of income except for the purpose of measuring the tax.
And certainly the Act is on its face a revenue measure.9 4 Unless one realizes
the probable effects and implications of the Act, it is doubtful whether he would
regard it as a measure intended to force corporations to distribute their earnings.
In order to have its constitutionality sustained, the Act would have to be
distinguished from the statute held invalid in the Child Labor case.95 In that
case, however, the Court laid stress on many criteria that are not present in the
Revenue Act of 1936. There were many regulations not concerned with the
raising of revenue. The Act on its face was an attempt to regulate child labor.
Furthermore, there were two provisions in the Child Labor Act that were
indigenous to that Act alone and would almost be sufficient in themselves to
differentiate the present tax Act from the Child Labor Act: (i) the Child
Labor Act provided for many duties which were to fall upon the Secretary of
Labor-a provision obviously not for the purpose of raising revenue. In the
Revenue Act the administration is in the hands of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. (2) The Child Labor Act provided that in the e- ent of non-scienter,
88. Especially would this be true since the limitations placed on the meaning of inter-
state commerce by the Supreme Court in the Schechter case, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
89. McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27 (1904), upholding the oleomargarine tax,
32 STAT. 193 (igm), 26 U. S. C. A. § 971 (935) ; United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S.
86 (igig), upholding the HAmusoN NARcoTIc DRUG Acr. 38 STAT. 785 (914), 26 U. S.
C. A. § 1040 (935); cf. Linder v. United States, 268 U. S. 5 (1925).
go. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20 (1922), holding unconstitutional the
child labor tax, 40 STAT. 1138 (1919); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44 (I922), holding un-
constitutional the GRAIN FURRuE TRADING Acr. 42 STAT. 187 (1921). A recent decision by
the Supreme Court on this point is United States v. Constantine, 296 U. S. 297 (1935) 84 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 663 (1936). The same general point came up again when the constitutionality
of the NATIONAL FIREARMs ACT [48 STAT. 1236 (934), 26 U. S. C. A. § 1132a (1935)]
was raised in United States v. Adams, Ii F. Supp. 216 (S. D. Fla. I935). This Act pro-
vided that anyone dealing commercially with firearms must pay a license tax and also levied
a tax of 2GOo upon the transfer of firearms. Judge Ritter upheld the tax on the theory
that it is a revenue measure on its face. See generally, Cushman, Social and Economic Con-
frol Through Federal Taxation (934) 18 MINN. L. REv. 757; Powell, Child Labor, Con-
gress, and the Constitution (1922) I N. C. L. REv. 61.
91. Powell, supra note go.
92. See Cushman, supra note go at 774.
93. (1928) 41 HARv. L. REv. 533 suggests a third test.
94. The Act is supposed to raise 8o5,ooo,ooo in revenue. N. Y. Times, June 21, 1936,
§ I, p. 1, col. 8, p. 31, col. 5.
95. 259 U. S. 20 (1922).
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i. e., if an employer did not know that the person employed was below the age of
sixteen, the penalizing tax did not apply. The present Act does no such thing.
If the corporation does not realize that it is withholding its income (perhaps
through faulty accounting) it is, nonetheless, subject to the full tax.
What Constitutes a. Taxable Share Dividend
Admittedly one of the effects of the Act will be to force the corporations to
distribute their annual income in a manner permitting the government to tax that
income in the hands of the shareholders, many of whom are presumably within
the higher income brackets. 96 The compelling force is the surtax on undistributed
income. Before this Act there was little pressure on corporations to distribute
their earnings; the new surtax creates or at least greatly enlarges that force. And
yet corporations will desire to retain as much of their earnings for expansion
purposes as they did in the past. This will present management with the problem
of how to keep the earnings and at the same time avoid payment of the surtax.
This can be done only by the issuance of taxable stock dividends, which will
effectuate the government plan of taxing the individuals within the higher
brackets on income 97 which, were it not for the surtax, would be left in the cor-
poration immune to taxation as a part of the individual's income.9" In the past,
corporations had no incentive to issue dividends taxable in the hands of the
shareholders, and the pressure of the wealthy persons controlling or influential in
the management of the corporation tended towards the issuance of non-taxable
dividends. There is now, however, because of the high corporate surtax, a
definite incentive for declaring dividends taxable in the hands of the stockholder.
If a corporation with a normal-tax net income of $I,ooo,ooo does not distribute
cash or other taxable dividends, the corporation pays a total tax of $323,327.79,
whereas, if the total adjusted net income is distributed in cash or stock dividends
taxable in the hands of the shareholders, the tax will be only the normal tax, or
$148,840. In the face of such heavy taxation, it seems that the predictions of
tremendously increasing dividend payments " will be realized in the future.
As to what will constitute a taxable dividend, if other than cash is dis-
tributed, there was considerable doubt until the recent case of Koshland v. Hel-
vering.10 0 And although that case has clarified the issues to a considerable
extent, there still remain many situations upon which the Supreme Court has
not yet ruled.
Eisner v. Macomber 101 is the classical stock dividend case. There, the
Supreme Court held that a common shareholder who received a stock dividend
of common shares realized no income but had merely received two pieces of
96. See Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means, supra. note 6 at pp. 25 et seq.
97. There is a possibility that corporations made up of parent and susbidiary associa-
tions may utilize the section exempting corporations in bankruptcy to avoid the surtax. Sec-
tion 14 (d) (2) states that "corporations which for any portion of the taxable year are in
bankruptcy under the laws of the United States, or are insolvent and in receivership in
any court of the United States or of any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia" are
exempt from the surtax. If the directors in charge of the corporate setup can put the parent
corporation into bankruptcy for any portion of a year, and then during that year have the
subsidiary companies pour their earnings into the parent in the .form of dividends, that setup
may avoid the tax. However, see supra p. 97 for the objections to any procedure involving
bankruptcy of a corporation.*
98. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. i89 (i92o). It is this requirement of realization
which today prevents the use of a tax system based wholly on the disregard of the cor-
porate entity. See supra note 17.
99. Seidman, Securities and the New Tax Law (June 29, 1936) BAuon's 3; U. S. News,
June 29, 1936, p. 14, col. I; TimE (Oct. 19, 1936) So.
ioo. 56 Sup. Ct. 767 (1936). For the facts of this case see page 124 of this RE iEw.
Io. 252 U. S. i89 (1920).
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paper which did not change his proportionate interest in the corporation. A
second ground of the Court's holding, disregarded by later decisions,10 2
was that for a shareholder to receive income there had to be a separation of
something from the corporate assets-an "outgo". 10 3  If the latter test had been
stringently applied, many of the Court's later opinions in the reorganization
cases would have perforce held otherwise. 0 4 Eisner v. Macomber was heralded
far and wide as "the stock dividend case". 10 5 It was natural, therefore, especially
in view of the very broad language used by the majority opinion, for lawyers
and laymen to assume that all stock dividends were not subject to a direct tax.
Treasury regulations were immediately promulgated following the decision stip-
ulating that stock dividends were to be exempted from income taxation.10 6 No
distinction was made as to what stock dividends were to be exempted-the regu-
lations were broad and seemingly excluded all as a subject of taxation. The
Act of 1921,107 and all acts thereafter, until the present one, contained provisions
that "a stock dividend shall not be subject to tax".10 The Supreme Court
in Koshland v. Helvering,100 holding that common shares awarded as a stock
dividend to holders of preferred shares constituted income because the share-
holders' interest in the corporation was proportionately different after the
stock dividend than before, said that it had for a long time attempted to inform
everyone that the case of Eisner v. Macomber was to be limited strictly to: its
1O2. Koshland v. Helvering, 56 Sup. Ct. 767 (936), and see cases cited infra note 1O4.
io3. 252 U. S. at 2o7.
1O4. In United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S. 156 (1921), each shareholder of New Jersey
corporation received two shares of common stock of the newly-created Delaware corpora-
tion .for each common share of the New Jersey corporation, without surrendering the orig-
inal share. The total assets of the New Jersey corporation were transferred to the Dela-
ware corporation. In Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U. S. 176 (1921), an oil and gas
corporation split into two separate corporations, the original one involved in the production
of oil, the other in the pipe line business. The assets necessary to the latter corporation were
transferred to it in exchange for its capital stock, which stock was distributed pro rata to
the shareholders of the original corporation. In Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U. S. 134 (923), a
Texas oil corporation dissolved, and its trustees in liquidation organized two other Texas cor-
porations (dividing the business as in Rockefeller v. United States). To each of these cor-
poratons was transferred the assets paid for by stock and bonds of the two newly formed cor-
porations. A holding company in Delaware was then created which took all the stock of the
Texas companies as payment for the stock of the Delaware corporation. The Delaware
stock and the bonds of the two new Texas corporations were then distributed to the share-
holders of the original company which was then dissolved. In Marr v. United States, 268
U. S. 536 (1925), a common and preferred (7%) shareholder in a New Jersey corporation
received from a Delaware corporation organized by the officers of the New Jersey corpora-
tion, to which all the assets of the earlier corporation were transferred, five new common
shares in exchange for one old common share and one and one-third new preferred shares
(6%) of Delaware stock for each preferred share of the subsequently dissolved New Jersey
corporation. In all four of these cases the Court found that the shareholder had received
income in the form of share dividends-yet in no one of these cases was there, substantively
speaking, any segregation of the assets of the corporation. There was no "outgo" other
than the transfer of the assets, or part of the assets, from one company to another company
substantially identical in composition and business purpose. The original corporation, look-
ing behind the mere formal transfer, still existed with all its original assets.
IO5. Note, for example, the titles of some of the articles commenting on Eisner v. Ma-
comber appearing while the case was pending, or immediately after the decision: Seligman,
Are Stock Dividends Incomef (191) 9 Am. EcoN. REIV 517; Powell, Stock Dividends, Direct
Taxes and the Sixteenth Amendment (192o) 20 Cor- L. Rv. 536; Warren, Taxability of
Stock Dividends as Income (1920) 33 HARV. L. REv. 885; Clark, Eisner v. Macomber and
Some Income Tax Problems (192o) 29 YAix L. J. 735.
1o6. U. S. Treas. Reg. 65, Art. 1547.
107. 42 STAT. 227, 228 (1921).
1O8. 43 STAT. 254 (1924); 44 STAT. 10 (1926) ; 45 STAT. 822 (1928); 47 STAT. 204
(I934).
io9. 56 Sup. Ct 767 (1936).
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facts.110 It is true that during the past sixteen years there had been built up
among the lower courts as well as in the Supreme Court, a strong series of cases
in which stock dividends of various sorts were held to be income.
111 Even
before the decision of the Macomber case, the Supreme Court in Peabody v.
Eisner"5 had held, that where Corporation A distributed to its shareholders
shares in Corporation B, the full value of the B shares were taxable to the
shareholder of A Corporation receiving them. But such a dividend has not
been regarded as a "true stock dividend" and the latter term, or the shorter
form "stock dividend", has been restricted to mean at least shares in the dis-
tributing corporation. 1 8
It was in the field of corporation reorganizations, however, that the Court
undertook in detail the problem of defining and redefining "income" as the term
applied to stock dividends. Gradually the Macomber case was limited in appli-
cation, but Congress and the Treasury failed to utilize the taxing possibilities
thus opened by the Court. Within a period of four years, from I92i to 1925,
IIo. Id. at 769.
iii. Some of the cases since Eisner v. Macomber holding stock dividends taxable: Vogt
Machine Co. v. United States, 39 F. (2d) 986 (Ct. Cl. I93O), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 861
(930) (dividend declared in cash, setting up a credit which was to be payable in stock in
six and twelve months thereafter, but against which account shareholder could draw
in cash) ; Comm'r v. Tillotson Mfg. Co., 76 F. (2d) 189 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935) (accrued divi-
dends of preferred stock paid in common stock of the corporation) ; Eugene E. Paul, 2 B. T.
A. 150 (1925) (cash dividend declared; six days later new stock issue was authorized, and
stockholders agreed that dividend check would be used to purchase the newly issued common
and preferred stock) ; W. J. Hunt, 5 B. T. A. 356 (1926) (prior to declaration of cash divi-
dends, stockholders agreed among themselves to apply check toward purchase of previously
issued stock) ; Luthe Hardware Co., 6 B. T. A. 53 (1927) (declaration of cash dividend fol-
lowed by increase in capital stock and majority shareholders who had not yet received cash
were paid off in stock) ; Margaret V. Payne, i9 B. T. A. 1305 (932) (cash dividend was de-
clared and checks were issued, but there was an agreement among stockholders that this
dividend was to be used for the purchase of new issue of stock) ; Joseph Paper, 29 B. T. A.
523 (I933) (declaration gave the stockholders option to take dividends in cash or in pre-
ferred stock) ; L. Elmer Wood, 29 B. T. A. 735 (1934) (declaration of cash dividend, giving
preferred shareholders the right to receive the dividend in cash or at their option to purchase
new peferred shares) ; United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S. I56 (I92I) ; Rockefeller v. United
States, 257 U. S. 176 (I92I); Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U. S. 134 (1923) ; Marr v. United
States, 268 U. S. 536 (1925); William C. Huntoon, I4 B. T. A. 459 (1928) (stock divi-
dend declared and shareholder turned it back immediately to the corporation to get indebt-
edness cancelled).
112. 247 U. S. 347 (i9i8).
113. Thus even U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, Art. 115-8 provided that "The issuance of its own
stock by a corporation as a dividend to its shareholders does not result in taxable income
to such shareholders." (Italics supplied.)
That this provision may not have meant what it seems expressly to say is indicated by
the decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals in Koshland v. Helvering and Commnr v. Til-
lotson and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Comin'r v. Tillotson. It was held that not
only were the stock dividends in those cases income, but also taxable under the 1932 Act
which contained the statement: "A stock dividend shall not be subject to tax." This rather
absurd result followed from the circular reasoning employed: The statutory exemption of
stock dividends was the direct result of the Eisner v. Macomber decision (which is incon-
trovertible); therefore, the provision was meant to apply only to those dividends which
under the Macomber case were not income Since the dividends in these cases did con-
stitute income, the statutory exemption has no application. In the face of the constant
Congressional hunt for new fields of taxation one can fully appreciate the difficulty the
Board of Tax Appeals and one circuit court of appeals had in believing that Congress
meant not to tax something it constitutionally could. But that does not justify a complete
disregard of the wording of the Act. The only logical view would seem to be that ex-
pressed in the majority opinion of the Koshland case: "Although Eisner v. Macomber
affected only the taxation of dividends declared in the same stock as that presently held by
the taxpayer, the Treasury gave the decision a broader interpretation which Congress
followed in the Act of 892i."
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five cases arose,114 all of which, though presenting varying factual differences,
were alike in that they involved the question as to whether the shares given by
the new company either in exchange for or in addition to the shares of the old
company constituted income in the hands of the shareholder to the amount that
the fair market value of the substituted or additional shares exceeded the cost
of the original shares. In all but one 15 of these cases the Court found that the
new and the old corporations were essentially different, so that the new shares
represented interests quite different from those evidenced by the first shares.
Such a finding met the first test of the Macomber decision, that of "different
proportionate interest". But clearly the corporation gave none of its assets to
the shareholder, a fact which would seem to be a requisite of the "separation"
test, if that test were required. In the other case,"(' which was the fourth
in point of time, the Court found such a similarity between the new and the old
corporations that each shareholder's proportionate interest remained the same
after reorganization as before-thus falling squarely within the limits of the
Macomber case, and therefore resulting in no income to the shareholder.
Thus far, the Supreme Court, faced with only four situations concerning
the stock dividend question, has decided: (i) common shares awarded as a
dividend to common shareholders do not constitute income "17 ; but (2) shares
of Corporation B issued as a dividend to shareholders of Corporation A," 8 .(0)
shares of a reorganized corporation (meeting the Court's test of being separate
and distinct from the old corporation) distributed to the shareholders of the old
corporation in exchange for or in addition to the shares already owned,11 9 and
(4) common shares issued as dividends to holders of preferred shares, 20 are all
income to the shareholders. There still exist, however, many problems which
have not as yet been adjudicated by the Court.' 21  As to these, the only guides
for corporations desiring to take advantage of Section 27 of the present Act by
distributing stock dividends taxable in the hands of the shareholders in order
to reduce the corporate surtax are the Treasury Regulations 22 dealing with
this phase of the law. The Regulations cover some but not all of the situations
and, as would be expected, answer most of the debatable issues in a manner
generally favorable to the government. Inasmuch as the new Act makes con-
siderations as to dividends of prime importance, an analysis of the unadjudicated
problems is appropriate.
Although Justice Brandeis in his dissent in the Macomber case confidently
assumed that the issuance of preferred shares would always constitute taxable
114. United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S. I56 (1921) ; Rockefeller v. United States, 257
U. S. 176 (1921) ; Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U. S. 134 (1923) ; Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U. S. 242
(1924) ; Marr v. United States, 268 U. S. 536 (1925).
115. Weiss v. Steam, 265 U. S. 242 (i924).
116. Ibid.
117. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 (1920).
i18. Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U. S. 347 (1918).
I19. See supra note 114.
i2o. Koshland v. Helvering, 56 Sup. Ct. 767 (1936).
121. As for example, whether any or all of the following will constitute the receipt of
taxable income: (i) the addition of voting rights (2) preferred share dividends issued to
either preferred or common shareholders (3) treasury shares (4) stock rights to one class
of shares distributed to another class (5) common shares chosen by a common shareholder
as a result of an option to select cash or common shares.
122. Thus, under U. S. Treas. Reg. 4674, Art. 115-3, preferred stock issued as a share
dividend to common shareholders is taxable (which view appears to be sound) ; Art. 115-4
states that where there is an option to take cash or stock, the receipt of stock constitutes
income (which also would seem sound) ; Art. 27-3 apparently decides that treasury shares
are taxable as income, since it provides for a dividend credit equal to the fair market value,
or to the adjusted basis of the stock in the hands of the corporation.
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income,1 2 8 there is no case law on the subject. Logic, however, would
seem to sustain this unsupported statement. 2 4 A preferred share gives to its
holder a right, prior to that of the common shareholders, to a certain
proportion of dividends as represented either by a given percentage of the
face value or amount in dollars designated as the preference. Therefore, every
time a dividend of preferred stock is awarded to holders of either common
shares or preferred shares, these shareholders now have either a new right or a
greater right (depending on whether they held common shares or preferred
shares before the dividend) to the first dividends paid by the corporation. Thus,
assuming that A holds one common share, and B one preferred share in X Cor-
poration, each of $oo par value, and there is declared a share dividend of one
preferred share for each share whether common or preferred, A now has a right
to a portion of any dividends declared whereas before he had no right to any
dividends until the preferred shareholders first received the amount of their
preference; concurrently, B has a right to more dividends before the common
shares participate in any distribution than he had before the dividend payment.
Therefore, the proportionate interests of both A and B in the corporation are
different after the distribution than before, and under the sole remaining test of
Eisner v. Macomber, iterated by the Court in Koshland v. Helvering,'2 5 those
preferred shares, representing that new interest, are income. Where the pre-
ferred shares are cumulative, A will, of course, be building up a credit that he
otherwise would not get (assuming that no dividends are distributed), and B
will be getting a much larger credit than he would have received had there been
no dividend distribution. In a jurisdiction, such as New Jersey, 2  which ap-
plies the dividend credit theory, a somewhat strange result arises in one situation.
This is where A and B each have one share of $xoo par value, A's share being
common and B's preferred at six per cent, and there is a dividend declaration of
one preferred share each to A and B. As long as the distributed earnings after
the dividend amount to less than $9 per original share of common stock, the
dividend credit of A will be greater than it would have been had no share divi-
dend been declared. If, however, the earnings are exactly $9, then A will have
neither gained nor lost by the stock dividend; but if the earnings are more than
$9, A's credit will be less than it would have been had no share dividend been
declared. Of course, if the dividend had been given solely to A, then under no
circumstances would he be in a less favorable position, under the dividend
credit theory, after the share dividend than before. 27
123. 252 U. S. at 229.
124. See Magill, Realization of Income Through Corporate Distributions (1936) 36 COL.
L. REv. 519, 536.
I25. 56 Sup. Ct. 767 (1936). The Court in its opinion did not allude to the segregation
test.
( 26. Day v. United States Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co., 95 N. J. Eq. 389, 123 At!. 546
(1924), aff'd, 96 N. J. Eq. 736, 126 Atl. 302 (1924); Elkins v. Camden & Atl. R. R., 36
N. J. Eq. 668, 7o Atl. 929 (i9o8), aff'd, 75 N. J. Eq. 539, 73 Atl. 514 (1909). See Lattin,
Is Non-Cumultie Preferred Stock in Fact Preferred? (0930) 25 ILL. L. Ray. 21. The
term "dividend credit theory" is applied to describe the theory under which there arises
each year a "credit" in favor of the various shareholders in the corporation to the extent
that each shareholder would have received dividends had the entire earnings available for
dividends that year been distributed. Of-course, if all the earnings of a corporation are
distributed in the form of dividends, or if there are no earnings, no "dividend credit" would
arise.
127. Section 112 (b) (2) of the present Act says that "No gain or loss shall be rec-
ognized . . . if preferred stock in a corporation is exchanged solely for preferred stock
in the same corporation." This provision has been present in the Revenue Acts since 1921,
and were it not for the present Act which makes it desirable for the corporation to issue
taxable stock dividends rather than non-taxable ones, this provision would make it simple
for a corporation to issue what should constitute a taxable dividend of preferred shares to
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Section 27 (c) of the Act provides: "If a dividend is paid in property other
than money (including stock of the corporation if held by the corporation as an
investment) . . . [there shall be a] . . . dividends paid credit . • .,.
Section 27 (h) declares that "If any part of a distribution (including stock
dividends and stock rights) is not a taxable dividend in the hands of . . .
shareholders . . ., no dividends paid credit shall be allowed with respect to
that part." If, therefore, a dividend of treasury shares is not income, then
despite the provision in 27 (c) the corporation will not be allowed dividend
credit. Justice Brandeis in his dissent in the Macomber decision stated that he
had no doubt that such a distribution would constitute income.129 As authority
for that proposition he cited two early cases, one from Connecticut 180 and the
other from Massachusetts,' 31 both of these cases presenting the question as to
who, between the life-tenant and the remainderman, should receive such divi-
dends and deciding that they should go to the life-tenant. There are decisions
opposed to this view.8 2 In consideration of the fact that the legal attributes of a
"treasury share" are similar to those of an authorized but unissued share l8
(for example, neither can be voted or receive dividends) and that the legal
relations between a corporation and shareholder are the same whether the shares
issued as a share dividend were treasury shares or newly created shares, it is
difficult to sustain in logic any distinction in their treatment for tax purposes.
Take, for example, the exact Eisner v. Macomber situation. Assume that there
are five shareholders, each holding one common share. Lying in the corporate
treasury (if such a picture can be conceived) are five common shares that were
formerly issued but which have been returned to the corporation. These five
common shares are then divided equally among the shareholders. Has the pro-
portionate interest of any shareholders here changed one whit more than in
Eisner v. Macomber? The conclusion would therefore seem to follow that
treasury shares should be treated as all others and, when distributed as dividends,
should constitute income to the same extent.
Since the taxable stock dividend offers so many means for corporations
to retain their earnings and profits, while at the same time avoiding the cor-
porate surtax, it will be rarely that a corporation will reorganize in order to
holders of preferred shares without any tax on the recipient, by the mere device of having
the holder of the shares exchange them for a greater number of preferred shares. But no
such case arose before the 1936 Act and probably will not arise now, inasmuch as the inter-
est of the corporation at present lies in issuing taxable stock dividends, and therefore, will
gain nothing by taking advantage of this section-in fact, to do so would only react to the
corporation's detriment.
128. Section 27 (c) treats treasury shares distributed as dividends differently from other
taxable share distributions by providing that ". . . the dividends paid credit . . . shall
be the adjusted basis of the property in the hands of the corporation at the time of the pay-
ment, or the fair market value of the property at the time of the payment, whichever is the
lower."
1:29. 252 U. S. at 228.
i3o. Green v. Bissell, 79 Conn. 547 (1907).
131. Leland v. Hayden, io2 Mass. 542 (1869).
.132. The cases are collected in Note (1923) 24 A. L. R. 76.
133. Drinker, The Pre-enptive Right of Shareholders to Subscribe to New Share
(1930) 45 H.Av. L. Rxv. 586, 603, n. 45: "There is some loose talk in the cases about a
corporation owning its shares. . . .. A corporation cannot, of course, own its own shares,
as an asset, any more than a man can swallow his own oesophagus. When a corporation
acquires its own shares, what happens is that a part of the co-proprietors buy out one of their
former associates. When they do this with the intention of presently substituting a new
associate, the corporation carries the shares, at cost, as an asset, with the fiction that they
are outstanding, although they are really but a book entry and not recognized for voting
purposes or in connection with such practical problems as income taxation." For the view
that treasury shares are taxable see Winsor, The Possibility of Taxing Dividends Paid in
Treasury Stock (192i) 2 NAT. INCOME TAX MA.. 328.
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avoid the surtax.18 But occasionally a reorganization may be made necessary
either through court order or business exigency. If in the reorganization the
shares of the new corporation are awarded to the shareholders of the original
corporation, without exchange of the old shares for the new, the Act does not
govern the situation ; but it would seem that if that which the shareholders receive
meets the test of a taxable stock dividend, the shareholder should be taxed as on
the receipt of income. If, however, in the reorganization the shareholders sur-
render their shares in exchange for new shares, then despite the fact that the
total market value of all their shares is equal to or greater than the market value
of the combined old and new shares in the preceding situation, no gain or loss is
recognized. Under the latter facts the corporation would, therefore, receive no
dividends paid credit since the shareholders had been given no income taxable
under the Act.
The corporate reorganization cases, long a favorite theme upon which
writers .dwelled in discussing the nature of income, are reduced from practical
importance to historical interest. Throughout the years they indicated a trend
which found its natural culmination in Koshland v. Helvering. With a basic
misconception cleared by the holding of the Court in its latest opinion 13 on the
subject, the fears of many that the taxing power of the government had been
greatly crippled by the decision by Eisner v. Macomber have been allayed.
One more situation merits discussion. If a corporation declares a cash
dividend with an option to the recipient thereof to purchase stock, and the
option is exercised, it is clear that the shareholder has received income; his
exercise of the option has no effect on the preceding receipt of income. The
situation becomes more complicated where the corporation gives to the share-
holders their choice of either stock or cash. In fact, under the 1934 Treasury
Regulations 1'9 the shareholder, if he chose to receive his dividend in a form of
stock dividends ordinarily non-taxable, was held to have received no income,
although there was authority in the Board of Tax Appeals to the contrary.3 7
The 1936 Treasury Regulations have resolved the doubt in favor of the view
adopted by the Board of Tax Appeals and now provide that if the shareholder
has the right to an election between cash and stock and chooses the shares, the
share dividend is realized income even though it would not have been so con-
sidered had there been no alternative offer of cash. 38 Under the regulation,
this would be so even if all the shareholders accepted stock. This problem has
never been raised before the Supreme Court, but it is probable that the Court
would sustain at least the theory behind the regulation, though, as will be pointed
out, it might find fault with a few of its details.
When a corporation declares in the alternative a dividend in stock or cash,
with the choice in the shareholder, since there is an obligation running from
the corporation to its shareholders which the corporation may have to satisfy
entirely by cash, the result is similar to the situation in which a corporation
declares a flat cash dividend with the option in the shareholder to purchase
stock. In both instances, the corporation and the shareholders have the same
rights and liabilities. It would seem, therefore, that the same result should
follow. The test used by the English courts, as one authority 139 has pointed out,
134. Before the present Act there was much discussion as to the avoidance of taxes
through corporate reorganizations. See BAA AND MomIs, HIDDEN TAXES IN CoR0'oaTs
REoRGANIZATIONS (935) 441.
135. 56 Sup. Ct. 767 (1936).
136. G. C. M. 67o9, VIII-2 Cum. Buir 132 (1929).
137. L. Elmer Wood, 29 B. T. A. 735 (1934).
138. U. S. Treas. Reg. 4674, Art. "5-4.
139. Magill, supra note 124, at 535.
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has been: Was the choice offered to the shareholder such a one that economically
there actually existed an alternative? Thus, if the fair market value of the share
was much higher than the cash equivalent offered, the court would find that what
actually had been intended was a stock dividend. Such a test might well be
followed by the American courts, for if the courts would enforce strictly the
wording of the Treasury Regulation, Eisner v. Macomber would very easily be
overridden. Any corporation seeking to declare a dividend of common shares
to common shareholders merely would have to make the dividend declaration in
the form of an election of cash or shares, with the cash offered far below the fair
market value of the shares. In addition, in order reasonably to assure an actual
election, it is suggested that the courts take into consideration the cash balance,
liquid investments, and corporate history of the corporation, for if a corporation
with a very small cash balance and frozen assets declares a dividend in the alter-
native, it is likely that it intended the dividend to take the form of shares and not
cash. Of course, corporations will sometimes borrow in order to pay dividends,
and this in no way reflects upon its financial stability. A study of the corporate
history would help in a situation where the corporation had in the past fre-
quently declared such dividends and only about thirty or forty per cent of its
shareholders had accepted cash. In such a case, it might well be that although
the corporation had a small cash balance, it would be sufficient to pay the
usual demand for cash dividends-and in fact, the corporation might have
intended this to be a cash dividend for those desiring it. But a further
difficulty is caused by the statement in the Treasury Regulations that even if the
election by the shareholders is exercised or exercisable before the dividend dec-
laration, the corporate distribution is taxable.1 40  It is not readily conceivable
how a shareholder may have a real election if there has been as yet no dividend
declaration. Until then, the shareholder has no right to any money or shares.
Any election he makes must come after that declaration. If, before there
is any corporate declaration, the shareholders band together and decide that
they all, or a substantial majority of them, will take shares of stock, it would
seem that the following "option" offered by the dividend declaration is but a
fiction, and one through which the court should look.14' Especially would
this be so if at the same time the corporation had practically no cash or liquid
investments available.142 And since the courts have done this, even where the
subsequent declaration was entirely in the form of cash plus an option to purchase
shares' 48 they should a fortiori reach the same result here. If that is done, and
the factual situation presented is similar to that of Eisner v. Macomber, that
which the shareholder receives is not income. On this basis, the broad terms of
the Treasury Regulation may very likely be held invalid.
In brief, it is clear that many forms of stock dividends may be utilized by a
corporation which desires to retain its earnings and avoid the surtax. In order
to succeed, the corporation must avoid those distributions which do not, under
the holdings of the Supreme Court, constitute income to the shareholder. But the
restrictions now imposed are few. Corporations need not fear that their days of
14o. U. S. Treas. Reg. 4674, Art. 115-4 (2).
141. See Irving v. United States, 44 F. (2d) a46 (Ct. Cl. 1930).
z42. George T. Smith, 21 B. T. A. 782 (1930) ; Irving v. United States, 44 F. (2d) 246
(Ct. Cl. 193o) ; United States v. Mellon, 281 Fed. 645 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922). Such a declar-
ation, obviously would be an attempt by the corporation to distribute a dividend, ordinarily
tax-free, in such a manner as to subject it to the individual's income tax in order that the
corporation obtain a dividend credit.
143. United States v. Davison, i F. (2d) 465 (W. D. Pa. 1924), Off'd, 9 F. (2d) io22
(C. C. A. 3d, z926), cert. denied, 271 U. S. 670 (1926).
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expansion are in the past. Had Koshland v. Helvering 1 44 been decided other
than it was, they might have been hampered by the limited field within which
their stock dividends would be held taxable to the shareholder. As it is, no
resourceful corporation, wide-awake to the necessary implications of that deci-
sion, will suffer through the new surtax feature of the Act; the result, in the
main, will be greater taxes levied upon those who best can afford them.
D. C. and A. B. G.
i44. The Supreme Court's decision in Koshland v. Helvering rounds out a judicial
definition as regards income. Income is the receipt by a shareholder of a new right,
which changes his proportionate interest in the corporation, other than the right that the cor-
poration debit the surplus account and credit the capital account. Cf. Note (1932) 45 HARV.
L. Rav. io72 in which the writer contends that the Supreme Court has abandoned an attempt
at a definitive concept of income. The definition presented above is descriptive if not defini-
tive. There need be no gain (see Magill, supra note 124 at 532), or severance of the assets
from the corporation (see supra note o2). The following, in addition to those already
presented, on a basis of the definition suggested, should be held to be income: (I) Stock
rights granting to the shareholder something he did not have before. See MAGILL, TAXABLE
INcOME (1936) 49, 50. (2) Bonds. See Doerschuck v. United States, 274 Fed. 739 (E. D.
N. Y. 192i) ; United States v. Fuller, 42 F. (2d) 471 (E. D. Pa. 1930). (3) Scrip, notes,
etc., giving the shareholder now a creditor's rights against the corporation, where prior
thereto he had only an owner's rights. (5) Rights to participate in dividends beyond the
preference of preferred shareholders, or to cumulative dividends theretofore non-cumulative.
In all of these cases the element of realization is still present, for all of these interests,
in order that they may constitute income, must be acquired.
